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The Caliph’s New Clothes: 
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
Stephan Rosiny
On 9 June 2014, fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) pushed deep into 
Iraq from Syria. Within a few days they had taken over the west of the country and 
advanced to just outside of Bagdad. On 29 June 2014 they declared the formation of the 
“Islamic State” and a new caliphate.
Analysis
For the first time, jihadists are in control of a contiguous, transnational territory in the 
Middle East. However, with the designation of their leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 
as “the Caliph” – the religious and political leader of all Muslims – they may have 
overreached, ideologically and politically.
  The rapid success of ISIS in Iraq has several causes: Iraq is politically and ethnically 
divided and in some places without centralized power. ISIS already had a territorial 
base in Syria and some Iraqi towns under its control; extensive resources in terms 
of weapons, money, and fighters; and Iraqi allies in the fight against the unpopular 
government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Baghdad.
  By adopting the early Islamic concept of the caliphate, ISIS is appealing to many 
Muslims’ longing for cultural authenticity, religious purity, and political unity. It is 
not fulfilling this promise, however, because its brutal approach is dividing societies 
and even scaring off many Sunni Muslims – whom it claims to defend.
  Inherent to the caliphate is a claim to sole political and religious representation, 
which neither the existing Muslim states nor most Sunni religious authorities will 
be willing to accept – not to mention the numerous religious and ethnic minorities 
in the region.
  The advance of ISIS has intensified the fragmentation of Iraq and could accelerate 
the dissolution of the single state there. However, a breakdown into individual 
ethnic-confessional micro-states would not do away with ISIS. It would also not 
solve the country’s problems, but rather multiply them.
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Al-Qaeda in Iraq Has Become Radicalized  
since 2003
Since the founding of the state of Iraq in 1920, ten-
sions related to ethnic, confessional, tribal, and po-
litical identities have emerged repeatedly. Arabs 
compete with Kurds; Sunnis with Shiites; differ-
ent tribes, and various nationalist and Islamist ide-
ologies, with one another. This competition relates 
to the interpretation of historical, political, and re-
ligious “truth,” and also to the distribution of pow-
er and resources among groups and communi-
ties. The overthrow of the (Sunni) dictator Sad-
dam Hussein in April 2003 by a US-led “Coalition 
of the Willing” and the formation of a government 
dominated by the Shiite majority in 2005 intensi-
fied the tensions between the two Islamic confes-
sional communities. Iraq also became the scene of a 
regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, in which the Sunni–Shia division also formed 
the ideological dichotomy (Abdo 2013).
From April 2003 on, the US occupying pow-
er accelerated the breakdown of the Iraqi state 
– whether on purpose or through negligence re-
mains questionable – from which the country is 
still suffering today. In the anarchy phase follow-
ing the overthrow of the regime, the US troops al-
lowed the plunder and destruction of ministries 
and weapons depots. Only the oil ministry was 
protected on time. In May 2003 the US civilian ad-
ministrator, Paul Bremer, dissolved the Baath Par-
ty, which had ruled for decades, and the Iraqi Ar-
my. It was from their ranks that the armed resis-
tance to the occupation recruited from that point 
forward; in recent months many former Baath 
members and high-ranking members of the Iraqi 
army have reemerged within the rank and file 
of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), the former Iraqi 
branch of al-Qaeda.
After its expulsion from Afghanistan in 2001, al-
Qaeda found an ideal new field of operation in Iraq. 
It was able to supply itself with a large amount of 
weapons, with explosives, and with a huge num-
ber of angry young men. The leader of al-Qaeda 
in Iraq (AQI), the Jordanian Afghanistan veteran 
Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, ramped up the brutality 
of the global jihadists’ fight. In May 2004 he pre-
sented the global media with a video in which he 
himself beheaded American businessman Nicho-
las Berg as revenge for the torture practices in Abu 
Ghraib prison, which had been revealed shortly 
before. Murders staged for the media remain the 
trademark of his movement up to today.
In addition, the supporters of the Iraqi al-Qa-
eda typically have an extreme hatred of Shiites, 
whom they pejoratively describe as rafidun (“re-
jectionists”) because they would not recognize 
the first three “rightly guided caliphs,” Abu Bakr, 
Umar, and Uthman, as well as many of the Proph-
et’s companions. This disobedience makes them 
“apostates” and thus legitimate targets for mur-
der according to the AQI ideology. Therefore, the 
Zarqawi branch of al-Qaeda carried out numer-
ous suicide and bomb attacks against Shia reli-
gious processions, shrines, and residential areas. 
Although al-Zarqawi was killed on 7 June 2006 
by a US air strike, the allied forces were only able 
to force al-Qaeda to go underground, with the 
help of Sunni tribal fighters from the Awakening 
Movement (al-Sahwa), in 2008. The anti-Shiite ter-
ror campaign subsided but has still not come to an 
end today. The Islamic State in Iraq (ISI, al-Daw-
la al-Islamiyya fi-l-Iraq), as the group had come to 
call itself in the meantime, also hung onto a tight 
network of supporters. According to Athil al-Nu-
jaifi, the governor of Mosul, it ran an oil-smug-
gling network right under the nose of the US occu-
piers and the Iraqi state. It also established strong 
links within the police and the army and black-
mailed “taxes” from Mosul’s traders. It was with 
this income that ISI financed its advance into Syr-
ia (al-Hayat, 2 July 2014).
The Expansion into “Greater Syria”  
(Bilad al-Sham)
The Arab Spring created new room to maneuver 
for jihadism. Some authoritarian regimes were 
overthrown or significantly weakened by popular 
protest movements. In most of the protest coun-
tries, moderate, reform-oriented Islamists were 
among the winners of parliamentary elections 
– for example, in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. 
But fundamentalist Salafists, who had previous-
ly mostly been apolitical or obeyed the regimes, 
started to openly demand the Islamization of so-
ciety. In their behavior and their “striving in the 
way of God” (jihad fi sabili-llah) they have imitat-
ed the life cycle of the Prophet Muhammad and 
have adapted very quickly and pragmatically to 
changing circumstances. Like Muhammad in his 
first prophetic phase in Mecca (610–622), they are 
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using their “Islamic calling” (al-da`wa al-islamiyya) 
to Islamize the society through grassroots efforts. 
But some are also, like the later prophet-turned-
statesman (622–632), making political demands 
for an “Islamic state” based on the Covenant of 
Medina. Migration and segregation from nonbe-
lievers (hijra) represent a further form of jihad. 
In the same way that Muhammad left the city of 
Mecca, which was then ruled by polytheists, with 
the early Islamic community in 622 and migrated 
to the allied Medina, the Muslims today should 
break with their “non-Islamic” surroundings and 
come to the “Area of Islam” (Dar al-Islam) in or-
der to strengthen it. Finally, jihadist Salafis are 
calling for a global armed fight against the global 
power of the “nonbelievers” and the “non-Islam-
ic” regimes in the Islamic world. Al-Qaeda, which 
was formed by the Arab veterans of the Afghani-
stan War (1979–1988), is seen as the initiator of the 
latter orientation and continues to be its primary 
“base” (qa`ida).
As of mid-2011 the uprising in Syria escalat-
ed into civil war. The Salafists, who were formerly 
oppressed under Bashar al-Assad, radicalized and 
militarized (Pierret 2013). At the beginning of 2012, 
ISI fighters of Syrian origin returned from Iraq un-
der their emir, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, and 
formed the nucleus of the Syrian al-Qaeda fran-
chise, the Nusra Front (the Supporting Front). In 
addition to jihad veterans from the battlefields of 
Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Iraq, and 
Libya, the uprising in Syria also continues to draw 
many new religious fighters (mujahidun) – for ex-
ample, from European countries – because it has 
received a great deal of attention worldwide due 
to its brutality, because access through Turkey is 
relatively easy, and because many financiers from 
the conservative Gulf monarchies are willing to 
donate money for a jihad against the “Alawite” re-
gime in Syria. 
For the jihadists, the popular uprising against 
the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad is sec-
ondary, the democratization of Syria irrelevant. 
For them the current-day territory of Syria repre-
sents much more the building block of a far-reach-
ing salvation. Their interim goal is the “libera-
tion” of Greater Syria (Bilad al-Sham) – which, in 
addition to today’s state of Syria, includes Leba-
non, Jordan, and Palestine – as the nucleus of an 
Islamist empire that is to be rebuilt, that of the ca-
liphate. In addition to the Nusra Front, the full 
name of which is Jabhat al-Nusra li Ahli-l-Sh-
am (Supporting Front for the Residents of Great-
er Syria), other Islamist militias also use the term 
“Sham” instead of the word for the modern state, 
“Syria” (Arabic: Suriya), in their names.
Sham has a special salvational meaning for 
Muslims, because Jerusalem (al-Quds, the Holy) 
was the initial prayer direction in Islam and the 
starting point of the Prophet Muhammad’s ascen-
sion into heaven. The Second Caliph, Umar (634–
644), secured the city for Islamic rule through ne-
gotiations. In 690 the Umayyad Caliph, Abd al-
Malik, built the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa 
Mosque on the Temple Mount. Furthermore, Da-
mascus became the capital city of the Umayyad 
Caliphate (661–750). This is where the graves of 
Saladin, who drove the crusaders out of Jerusa-
lem in 1187, and of Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1263–
1328), an Islamic scholar held in high esteem by 
Salafists today, are located. Several Shiite shrines 
are also located in Sham, such as the shrine of the 
Prophet’s granddaughter Zaynab near Damascus. 
In addition, Sham is also connected to eschatolog-
ical expectations, because according to both Sunni 
and Shia sources a terrible civil war is supposed to 
foreshadow the appearance of the apocalyptic re-
deemer (the Mahdi).
This symbolic density motivates current-day 
religious fighters of both confessions to come to 
Sham. Shiite militia members from the Iranian-
backed Lebanese Hezbollah and from Iraq sup-
port the regime of the Alawite Shiite Bashar al-
Assad, thereby fuelling many Sunnis’ feeling that 
it is necessary to defend Sunni Islam against “Sa-
fawid” – that is, Iranian hegemony.1
The Iraqi branch of the ISI didn’t want to miss 
out on this symbolic location either. It entered in-
to the Syrian civil war in the early part of 2013 by 
settling in the already “liberated” territories in 
the east of the country. On 9 April 2013 its leader 
(since 2010), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared the 
group’s amalgamation with the Nusra Front – the 
Syrian branch of al-Qaeda and in fact its own off-
spring – to become the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Greater Syria (al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi-l-Iraq wa-
l-Sham), or ISIS for short. Only a day later, howev-
er, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani denied the amal-
gamation. And on 23 May 2013 the leader of al-
Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, demanded that Bagh-
dadi withdraw back to Iraqi territory. A break be-
1 “Safawi,“ which refers to the Iranian Safawid dynasty (1501–
1722), is a pejorative term used by many (Sunni) Arabs today 
to describe Iranian influence.
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tween the two al-Qaeda branches and between 
ISIS and its parent organization al-Qaeda ensued. 
In the first half of 2014 alone, 6,000 people died in 
battles between ISIS and the Nusra Front and be-
tween ISIS and other opposition groups such as 
the Islamic Front and the Free Syrian Army. ISIS 
has repeatedly been able to recapture lost territo-
ry and to expand – often without a fight, as ma-
ny Salafist and jihadist fighters have deserted to 
it. Foreign jihadists and a younger generation of 
jihadists feel particularly drawn to ISIS’s uncom-
promising approach. The group has attacked com-
peting Salafist and jihadist groups, which Baghda-
di has accused of apostasy (ridda), with great bru-
tality: car bombs, suicide attacks, and the murder 
of leaders. The Syrian campaign has also been ec-
onomically successful for ISIS, because the Syrian 
oil fields around Dair al-Zor have made possible 
the sale of oil to Bashar al-Assad’s regime, to Tur-
key, and, since July 2014, to Iraq. 
The Return to Iraq
The expansion into Syria was accompanied by 
Baghdadi’s increasingly undisguised claim to be 
the supreme and only legitimate representative of 
the jihad in Iraq and Syria. His longtime plan to 
establish a caliphate, however, required a trans-
national territory, for which the power vacuum in 
Iraq offered an opportunity.
On 9 June 2014, ISIS launched a surprise attack 
and took over several Iraqi cities, including Mo-
sul, and parts of the provinces Anbar, Niniveh, 
Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salahuddin within just a few 
days. The Iraqi army and security forces, which 
were technically superior in number and weapon-
ry, fled haphazardly; 30,000 soldiers deserted in 
the face of a militia with – at that time – an esti-
mated 7,000 to 10,000 fighters. As they advanced, 
the latter destroyed security facilities and symbols 
of the Iraqi state and plundered weapons depots 
containing modern US weaponry, tanks, and artil-
lery – including Scud missiles and Humvees. They 
took the property of the state and of civil servants 
as well as that of minorities who had been driven 
out or even massacred – such as the Christians of 
Mosul, and later the Yazidis and other minorities – 
as spoils of war (ghanima). They kidnapped young 
Yazidi women and sold them to their fighters. Ad-
ditionally, ISIS announced the expansion of fight-
ing to, for the time being, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Lebanon, and Palestine. 
Even if nobody had expected such a massive 
move on the part of the jihadists, the offensive 
was not a complete surprise. Parallel to the upris-
ings of the Arab Spring there had also been pro-
tests in Iraq since 2011. Many Iraqis complained of 
the increasingly authoritarian rule of Prime Min-
ister Nuri al-Maliki; rampant corruption; and the 
insufficient provision of power, water, and securi-
ty. Following the violent actions of the Iraqi secu-
rity forces against the protest camps in the west-
ern Sunni provinces in April 2013, the confession-
al element of the conflict had intensified. In Janu-
ary 2014, following a violent crackdown on a pro-
test camp in Ramadi, there was an armed upris-
ing, which ISIS also took part in. After the parlia-
mentary elections in April 2014 no governing ma-
jority could be established because Sunni Arab, 
Kurdish, and some Shiite politicians did not want 
to grant Maliki a third term. 
It was in this power vacuum that the ISIS attack 
of June 2014 took place. In addition to the weak-
ness of the security forces, its military success can 
be explained by the mobile tactics of the fighters, 
who attacked with some suicide bombers, then 
broke through the “front lines” on pick-ups and 
looted Humvees and started a guerilla war while 
“sleeper cells” in the hinterlands simultaneously 
carried out bomb attacks. The militias massively 
intimidated their opponents with the use of exces-
sive force, separating border guards, police, and 
soldiers according to their sectarian affiliation: 
Sunnis were “forgiven” if they joined ISIS; Shiites 
and members of other minorities were murdered 
by the hundred if not by the thousand. Propagan-
da videos on the Internet showed the brutal exe-
cution of prisoners by mass shooting or sadistical-
ly slow beheading. Finally, ISIS undertook a skill-
ful policy of allying with supporters of the Baath 
Party, fighters from the Sufi Naqshbandi order, 
and Sunni tribal fighters.
The Declaration of the Caliphate
On 29 June 2014, the first day of the Islamic fasting 
month of Ramadan, ISIS surprised the global pub-
lic with a further coup: its speaker, Abu Muham-
mad al-Adnani, announced that the ISIS council 
had designated its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 
as the new caliph. All Muslims were to pledge their 
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obedience to him (bai`a). Baghdadi’s civil name, 
Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Qurashi al-Hashimi al-
Husseini al-Samarra’i, indicates, in addition to his 
origins in Samarra, his supposed descent from the 
Quraish tribe – a condition for the office of caliph-
ate according to classical teachings – from the clan 
of the Prophet, Banu Hashim; and even directly 
from Muhammad over his grandson Hussein.
In subsequent days there followed additional 
appearances with key messages for the Muslims 
of the world. On 1 July 2014 the caliph declared 
that it was the individual duty of every Muslim 
around the world to undertake the hijra (migra-
tion) to the land of Islam. He explicitly called on 
Islamic legal professionals and judges, engineers, 
administrators, and doctors to help in building the 
state.2 Thousands of Muslims have so far followed 
this “order” and have joined the Islamic State. On 
the first Friday of Ramadan, 4 July 2014, “Caliph 
Ibrahim” held his first Friday sermon in Mosul’s 
Great Mosque. Because of a war injury suffered in 
the “jihad,” he ascended to the pulpit with a limp. 
There he first cleaned his mouth with a tooth-
cleaning twig, a devout gesture among Salafists, 
before taking the verses of the Qur’an, “God’s 
words” – with which he strengthened his sermon, 
held in classical high Arabic – into his mouth. He 
was dressed in a black turban and cloak, as Mu-
hammad was supposedly also clothed when Mec-
ca was recaptured in the year 630. Even his valu-
able watch, which had been heavily mocked in 
Internet forums, demonstrated, as a legitimate 
“spoil of war” according to Islamic law, the mate-
rial advantages of jihad. On the whole, however, 
he presented himself humbly as “an equal among 
equals” who had taken on the heavy burden of the 
caliphate. “Obey me, as I obey God and his mes-
senger. If I do not obey God and his messenger, 
you don’t have to obey me.” With this rhetorical 
phrase, which he took from Abu Bakr’s inaugural 
speech as caliph in 632, he distanced himself from 
the power-hungry despots of the region. He si-
multaneously adhered to the Salafist creed forbid-
ding any worship of a person as holy. Anything 
else would, according to this strict interpretation, 
be polytheism (shirk). Implicitly, however, he also 
indicated that he would not accept any other polit-
ical or religious leader’s orders anymore – especial-
ly not those of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
2 For an English translation, see: <https://ia902501.us.archive.
org/2/items/hym3_22aw/english.pdf> (29 July 2014).
In the areas it controls in Iraq and Syria, IS has 
taken on ever more functions of a state: it imposes 
taxes and customs duties; distributes food; pass-
es draconian Islamist court verdicts; maintains in-
formation offices and a secret service; presents it-
self with the capital Raqqa, a flag and a hymn; has 
a council and various executive organs; and grants 
its own passports in Mosul.
The Omnipotence of the Caliph
From the viewpoint of the new state, inherent to 
the caliphate are political and religious powers 
that cannot be called into question. These can be 
summarized as three guiding principles. 
1) The caliph is the political leader of all Mus-
lims. The man-made, colonial borders of the na-
tion-states are irrelevant and should be demol-
ished. At the border between Syria and Iraq, ISIS 
fighters have already celebrated this symbolical-
ly by destroying some border fortifications.3 Ac-
cordingly, the Islamic State in Iraq and in Sham 
renamed itself Islamic State (IS, al-Dawla al-Is-
lamiyya), without any territorial limitations, at 
the same time as the caliphate was declared. 
A single political entity has not existed within 
the Islamic community since the middle of the 
seventh century, as the classical caliphates such 
as those of the Umayyads, Abbasids, and Otto-
mans each only controlled parts of the areas in-
habited by Muslims. Caliph Ibrahim has thus 
returned to the beginnings of Islam, when, dur-
ing the period of the first four “rightly guided” 
Rashidun caliphs Abu Bakr (632–634), Umar 
(634–644), Uthman (644–656), and Ali (656–
661), at least territorial unity still existed – even 
though the confessional split into Sunni and 
Shia had already become apparent. The IS thus 
calls itself “The Second Rashidun Caliphate.”
2) The caliph enjoys supreme religious authority 
over all Muslims. He is responsible for the intro-
duction and imposition of sharia, “God’s law.” 
For example, the “Information Office” in Mosul 
has published comprehensive rules of behavior 
for the residents.4 Sharia is regarded by the IS as 
3 In an English-language Internet video from 29 June 2014, “Abu 
Safiyya from Chile” celebrated the end of Sykes-Picot – on-
line: <http://aljazeera-news.net/focus/letters-to-editors/42536-
end-of-sykes-picot.html> (3 September 2014).
4 Excerpts were published in the Huffington Post, 13 June 2014 
– online: <www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/06/13/isis-iraq-
brutality_n_5490910.html> (30 July 2014).
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decisive and must be implemented – with vio-
lence if necessary. ISIS had already proclaimed 
its complete sovereignty of interpretation. For 
example, in January 2014 it refused to recognize 
an Islamic mediation court in the conflict be-
tween it and other Salafist and jihadist groups 
because “as a state” it could not accept a court 
outside its jurisdiction (Bunzel 2014). The group 
now appears to be attempting to strengthen this 
claim through the declaration of the caliphate.
3) Anyone who does not acknowledge the caliph 
is an “apostate.” The declaration of the caliph-
ate is above all a self-authorization to exercise 
autocratic rule. Whoever does not obey the ca-
liph, so goes the undisguised threat in practi-
cally all IS statements, is an apostate (murtadd). 
According to this radical understanding, the 
caliphate is in fact a “license to kill.” The fact 
that Baghdadi took on the honorific name of 
“Abu Bakr” could be a reminder of the Ridda 
Wars of the First Caliph, who bore the same 
name: Many tribes had joined forces with the 
Prophet Muhammad in a sort of tribal alliance 
and pledged him their loyalty (bai`a). After his 
death, they viewed the political alliance as be-
ing dissolved; Abu Bakr and the young Islamic 
community, however, who understood the oath 
of loyalty as applying to the Islamic communi-
ty and not the person of Muhammad, did not. 
These tribes were thus seen as disobeying the 
Islamic community. They had renounced this 
community (ridda) and had thus become apos-
tates (murtaddun), who were then fought and 
defeated. Translated to the current day, Bagh-
dadi is pursuing “apostatic” movements, such 
as the Nusra Front in Syria, that deny him their 
allegiance, and thus purportedly reestablishing 
the unity of the Islamic community.
“The Caliph Has No Clothes!”
The surprising territorial expansion of the Islam-
ic State and the proclamation of the caliphate can’t 
distract from the new entity’s massive legitimacy 
deficits. To date IS has only been able to establish 
itself in those peripheral areas of the civil-war-
weakened states of Syria and Iraq that were al-
ready outside of or only weakly within state con-
trol. The tearing down of the “Sykes-Picot bor-
ders,” a media success, was thus more for show. In 
the meantime the IS fighters have come up against 
the core regions held by Syrian and Iraqi troops 
and by the Kurdish Peshmerga fighters. The Iraqi 
government has regrouped its security forces and 
sent its elite troops. Voluntary Shia militias, which 
are much more motivated than the Iraqi army to 
defend their holy shrines – for example, the two 
imam’s graves in Samarra – have also formed. The 
states on the caliphate’s immediate wish list – Jor-
dan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon – are already un-
dertaking extensive measures to fend off an infil-
tration or an attack by the IS. Even the coopera-
tion of political enemies such as the United States 
and Iran, and even Iran and Saudi Arabia, to com-
bat the joint threat is currently a possibility. Most 
importantly, the US government, at the request 
of the Iraqi government and the Kurdish regional 
government, has ordered its air force to strike IS 
military positions in Iraq. Since the end of August 
2014 it has also been seriously discussing the pos-
sibility of attacking IS targets in Syria.
The Islamic State also lacks important foun-
dations of statehood, such as established bor-
ders and the recognition of the international com-
munity and its own population. The caliphate is 
consciously keeping its borders vague because 
it wants to expand its territory. The protagonists 
are not concerned about diplomatic recognition: 
according to their understanding, those Muslim 
states that recognize the caliphate will automat-
ically be incorporated into the one Islamic State, 
whereas gaining recognition from the “nonbeliev-
er” states is explicitly not an aim. Ultimately, the 
new caliph is also not concerned about Muslims’ 
acknowledgment of his legitimacy: the duty to do 
so is, according to his interpretation, divine and 
not subject to human judgment.
Even Salafists and jihadists, who definitely 
share the ideological and theological foundations 
of the IS, reject the proclamation of the caliphate at 
this point in time and are comparing it with apos-
tate sects from the early period of Islam. For exam-
ple, the Islamic Front, the largest amalgamation of 
Syrian Salafists, equates IS with the Kharijites, the 
group of early purists, who “left” (kharaja) the Is-
lamic community because they saw it as having 
deviated from pure Islam. The Nusra Front de-
scribes its former parent organization IS as “ex-
tremists” (ghula). Finally, it is contended that Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi – unlike his namesake – was not 
appointed as a result of the consensus of the com-
munity and the religious scholars but rather on-
ly by the council of his own troop of fighters. The 
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Salafist–jihadist camp is split deeply, and not even 
the collective enemy, Bashar al-Assad, is provid-
ing cohesion at the moment. For example, the Sau-
di-financed Army of Islam, a member group of the 
Islamic Front, has declared that the fight against 
the Islamic State has priority over the fight against 
the Syrian regime.
With the occupation and control of a territo-
ry, the IS has entered into classical warfare; in this 
type of war the state armies will be superior to it 
in the long term. It also needs to provide for its 
own population, something that ties up resources 
and has the potential to generate discontent. The 
introduction of a rigid sharia law with draconi-
an corporal punishments for everyday pleasures 
such as listening to music or smoking and the de-
struction of historical places of worship are alien-
ating the population. It is not just minorities such 
as the Christians, Shiites, Turkmen, and Yazidis – 
all threatened and persecuted with murder – who 
are fleeing the caliph, but also many Sunnis. 
A Strategy against Jihadism and Separation
Within the entirety of the Muslim community – 
and even within the Salafist camp – the Islam-
ic State caliphate is nothing more than a sect-like 
derailment. Yet, it is highly likely that it will in-
tensify its attacks, aggravate political conflicts in 
the region, and leave behind a trail of devastation 
and suffering. In the long run, however, not much 
is likely to remain of the “caliph without clothes” 
other than unfulfilled expectations. IS will not 
overcome the colonial borders or bring about the 
unification of Muslims but will rather contribute 
to the further fragmentation of the region. How-
ever, global jihadism will not completely lose its 
appeal as a result. What is really necessary, there-
fore, is concerted action by local, regional, and 
global actors that – unlike the “War on Terror” – 
also takes into account the political, socioeconom-
ic, and ideological roots of jihadism.
The jihadists have primarily taken hold in 
the heavily divided societies of the Middle East, 
where different ethnic-confessional and tribal iden-
tity groups are competing for power – for exam-
ple, in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Libya. 
Only in multiconfessional Lebanon have the elites 
of the various communities, following the expe-
rience of the civil war from 1975 to 1990, agreed 
on a power-sharing compromise that regulates 
the competition between these communities. Via 
guaranteed quotas and certain predetermined 
posts, all of these communities participate in the 
state. Competition thus takes place within the 
state – regarding posts, influence, and decisions 
– but is not about control of the state as a whole, 
as it is in other divided societies. Despite all the 
failures of this system – a confessional mentality 
that stretches into all areas of society and often-
difficult decision-making processes – the country 
has prevented a return to civil war for 25 years 
and has maintained a high degree of freedom and 
democratic participation. 
Whether Iraq and Syria continue to exist within 
their current-day borders remains to be seen. But 
a separation into small ethnic-confessional micro-
states would not bring calm to the region because 
new minority-group conflicts and wars regarding 
the drawing of new borders would arise. In the 
short term, a power-sharing compromise between 
the societal elites could be more effective, where-
as in the mid term, reliable state structures and a 
legal system that handles all people as equal cit-
izens need to be established. Fewer rather than 
more borders are necessary in the region in order 
to promote business, political cooperation, and 
cultural exchange. Western countries could pro-
vide more extensive statebuilding assistance – for 
instance, by advising institutions and supporting 
education. They could promote cooperation with-
in the region and with the West. This is definite-
ly more sustainable (and more economical) than 
dealing with the consequences of recurring radi-
cal ideologies and armed uprisings.
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